Begin forwarded message:
'The Mahdi does not negotiate. Neither should we'
By CHARLES S. FADDIS | Special to The Tampa Tribune
Published: February 05, 2012
Several years ago, prior to my retirement from the CIA, I was meeting with a senior Iranian asset in the Middle East. I had finished debriefing him on the intelligence he had to provide, and we had launched into a more expansive conversation about the overall direction of American policy toward Iran. I was trying to explain the rationale behind our sanctions regime and the thought process that had led us to conclude that we could persuade the Islamic Republic of Iran to modify its behavior.
The asset interrupted me. "You really don't have any idea who you are dealing with, do you?" he asked. I told him I was not sure I understood what he meant.
The source elaborated. We were under the illusion we were dealing with rational actors. We were not. We were under the illusion we were playing a game, which would stretch out over many years. Our adversaries in Iran shared no such belief.
They expected this conflict to reach its climax in the very near future.
They also knew, to a moral certainty, that they would win.
Iran is an overwhelmingly Islamic nation, and almost all Iranians belong to the Twelver sect of the Shia branch of Islam. This sect awaits the return of the 12th Imam, or Mahdi, a direct descendant of the Prophet Muhammed anointed by Allah himself. According to the Twelvers, the Mahdi has been in hiding in caves since the 9th century.
The Mahdi has been hidden for 1,200 years now, but he will return just before the Day of Judgment. According to the Hadith, his return will be preceded by three years of chaos, violence and cataclysmic events. He will rule over the world for a period of seven years, eliminate all tyranny and oppression, and usher in an era of peace. He is, in many ways, the Muslim equivalent of the Jewish Messiah or the Second Coming of Christ. He is, however, the only one of these apocalyptic figures who expressly intends violent world conquest.
Some Twelvers, including the current president of Iran, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, and the Iranian Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khameinei, believe that they are to prepare the way for the return of the Mahdi. In order to do so, they are to bring on the state of chaos and destruction, which will precede the Madhi's return. The worse things get; the faster they win.
The source's point was not simply to remind me of the tenets of the Twelver sect, with which I was already familiar. It was to stress the literal sense in which these tenets were understood by Ahmadinejad, Khameinei and their supporters. These were not, the source stressed, metaphors or parables. Ahmadinejad did not understand the story of the Mahdi to be a reference to some end state in which the world would live in peace and harmony. He understood it in a completely literal, simplistic way. He accepted it word for word as the absolute truth.
The Mahdi was, in effect, an Islamic superman. When he returned he would crush the infidels and apostates and create an Islamic empire that would control the entire planet. No one would be able to stand against him.
And, he was coming soon. As the source noted, the "End of Days" were not events of some distant future. They were around the corner. He guessed that Ahmadinejad probably thought in terms of a reappearance of the Mahdi within 18 months to two years.
Negotiation is all about leverage. Go onto a car lot and try to strike a deal with a guy who can hardly keep up with demand, and you're not going to have a lot of luck. Ask a guy who hasn't sold a car in month to make you an offer, and it may well be your lucky day.
Sanctions don't provide a lot of leverage over individuals who know as an article of faith that their secret weapon is about to emerge from his hiding place and slay their enemies.
Negotiation is also about rationality. At the height of the Cold War, no matter how bad relations between the United States and the Soviet Union were, we could always count on the Russians to be cold, calculating and rational. They might wish our destruction with every fiber of their beings, but they had no delusions about divine intervention. They understand, perhaps better than we did, the brutal, hard calculus demanded by reality.
None of that applies to our confrontation with Iran. Until such time as there has been a true sea change inside of Iran, negotiation and discussion is largely useless. We may choose to engage in it so that we are seen by the rest of the world as flexible and open to dialogue. We may choose to engage in it in order to buy time. We should be under no illusion that there is any real chance of such dialogue leading to a meaningful, lasting modification of Iranian behavior.
None of this is to suggest that we ought, therefore, rush to engage the Iranians in a conventional military conflict. We could no doubt make quick work of what passes for an Iranian Navy and clear the skies of Iranian aircraft in short order, but unless we are prepared to physically occupy Iran, neither of those things will solve our problem. We will still be faced with an implacable foe. And, in any event, another major conventional commitment of resources at this time in American history is probably the last thing we need.
It is an argument for a completely pragmatic, realpolitik approach to Iran. Negotiations will not work. Sanctions may physically weaken the Islamic regime and limit its ability to do harm, but they will not make it change course. We would prefer not to have to go to war. So, we should, therefore, take all measures short of open war to actively frustrate the objectives of the regime.
What that means in practice is this. If the Iranians need materials for nuclear weapons programs or other military purposes, we should deny them to them. To the extent possible we should look for all available means of dismantling and handicapping existing weapons programs. If necessary, and consistent with our laws and values, we should deny the Islamic regime access to the personnel it needs to continue to chart its present course. In other words, we should accept that we cannot expect the Iranians to alter their behavior or their attitudes and focus instead on physically preventing them from achieving their goals.
I have no illusions about the implications of the course of action I am suggesting. It is, in all likelihood, a recommendation that we conduct what amounts to a shadow war against Iran for the foreseeable future. However open-ended and however unsatisfactory this course of action may be, however, it is infinitely preferable to the alternative, which is to allow the Iranians to arm themselves with nuclear weapons and to continue to destabilize the Middle East and Central Asia.
The Mahdi does not negotiate. Neither should we.
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